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Abstract 
 
This article examines the relationship between human rights and labour law. It first 
explores the reasons for the resistance to examining labour rights as human rights. 
Second, it turns to European human rights developments in order to assess the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights in this context. It presents an 
interpretive technique adopted by the Court, the integrated approach, which takes 
note of social and labour rights in the interpretation of civil and political rights. 
The article argues that the integrated approach to interpretation needs firm 
theoretical grounding, and the third part suggests that the prohibition of workers’ 
exploitation is an important underlying principle that should guide our 
understanding of labour rights as human rights. It develops a definition of 
workplace exploitation on the basis of theoretical literature, and suggests some of 
its implications for the adoption of the integrated approach to interpretation.  
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Introduction 
 
Some view labour law as a subfield of contract law. On this view, the employment 
relationship must be regulated by principles of contract law because the 
employment contract is no different to other contracts. Others believe that “labour 
is not a commodity”.1 Workers and their labour are not like other things that you 
buy and sell; workers have dignity and rights, so the employment relationship 
must be regulated by principles of human rights law, rather than contractual rules. 
Human rights law developed exactly in order to protect human dignity, and there 
is no reason to think that the protection of dignity and rights should stop at work. 
In the last few years, the argument that labour law and human rights are 
interconnected has gathered momentum in scholarship and judicial decision-	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Anderson and all participants for comments and suggestions. 
1  Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation 
(Declaration of Philadelphia), adopted 10 May 1944. See analysis in Hugh Collins Employment 
Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2010) at ch 1, and see also Paul O’Higgins “Labour Is Not a 
Commodity” (1997) 26 Ind Law J 225, particularly at 230. 
making.2 It has been argued that human rights law can offer important insights to 
the critical development of labour law.3 
  
In the sections that follow, I first examine the reasons for the resistance to 
examining labour rights as human rights. Second, I turn to European human rights 
developments in order to assess the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights in this context. The third part suggests that we need a deeper understanding 
of labour rights as human rights that is grounded on the prohibition of workers’ 
exploitation. 
 
 
Labour Rights as Human Rights 
 
It has been said that human rights “has become the lingua franca of global moral 
thought”.4 There is a proliferation of literature that discusses their legal protection, 
some scholarship that discusses the relationship between their philosophical 
foundations and their legal protection,5 as well as an abundance of governmental 
and civil society organisations that aim to protect human rights on the ground. 
When referring to human rights, a good starting point is the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1948.6 The Declaration is not a legally binding document, but it is 
extremely influential. The Declaration protects rights such as freedom of 
expression,7 the right to life8 and the prohibition of torture,9 and also includes 
labour rights, such as the right to work, the right to free choice of employment, the 
right to fair remuneration ensuring a life with dignity, the right to form and join 
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Labour Rights in a Global Context (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 1 at 16; Colin Fenwick and 
Tonia Novitz “Conclusion: Regulating to Protect Workers’ Human Rights” in Colin Fenwick and 
Tonia Novitz (eds) Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) 587–588; Virginia Leary “The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights” in 
Lance Compa and Stephen Diamond (eds) Human Rights, Labour Rights and International Trade 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003) 22; Virginia Mantouvalou “Are Labour Rights Human 
Rights?” (2012) 3 ELLJ 151; Guy Mundlak “Labor Rights and Human Rights: Why Don’t the Two 
Tracks Meet?” (2012) 34 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 237; Lance Compa “Solidarity and Human Rights” 
(2009) 18 New Labour Forum 38. 
3 Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou “Human Rights and the Contract of Employment” in 
Mark Freedland (ed) The Contract of Employment (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 188. 
4 Michael Ignatieff “Human Rights as Idolatry” in Amy Gutmann (ed) Human Rights as Politics 
and Idolatry (Princeton University Press, 2001) at 53. 
5 James Nickel Making Sense of Human Rights (2nd ed, Wiley-Blackwell, 2007); George Letsas A 
Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
2007); Allen Buchanan The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
6 GA Res 217A, A/810 (1948). 
7 Article 19. 
8 Article 3. 
9 Article 5. 
trade unions,10 as well as the right to rest and leisure including reasonable working 
hours and holidays with pay.11  
 
The Declaration was criticised by some at the time that it was adopted for 
including rights such as holidays with pay alongside other liberal rights. Maurice 
Cranston said: “[w]hat the modern communists have done is to appropriate the 
word ‘rights’ for the principles that they believe in”.12 But Cranston’s critique has 
been addressed. David Luban said persuasively that those who criticise art 24 of 
the UDHR who probably:13 
 
…include academic critics writing during their sabbaticals – have not 
considered seriously what a working life would be for someone whose day-
to-day survival depends on a regular paycheck and who must work at a 
grinding job fifty-two weeks a year from age fifteen until premature death at 
fifty. 
 
As Jack Donnelly underlines in response to Cranston:14 
 
…the full right recognized is a right to “rest, leisure, and reasonable 
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay”. Denial of this 
right would indeed be a serious affront to human dignity; it was, for example, 
one of the most oppressive features of unregulated nineteenth century 
capitalism. 
 
However, human rights treaties adopted after the UDHR divided rights into two 
categories: civil and political rights (such as freedom of expression and the right to 
life) were protected in documents such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), while economic and social rights (such as the right to housing, the 
right to work and the right to decent working conditions) were included in treaties 
such as the European Social Charter (ESC). Civil and political rights were 
protected through the courts (the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the 
case of the ECHR), and individual petition procedures, while economic and social 
rights were monitored by committees (the European Committee of Social Rights in 
the case of the ESC) through reporting mechanisms and sometimes collective 
complaints procedures.15  
 
The development of labour law in the United Kingdom, Europe and elsewhere was 
relatively resistant to framing workers’ claims as human rights. Courts were often 	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reluctant to protect collective labour rights. For this reason, there was in the 1990s 
a trend in academic literature suggesting that human rights norms and adjudication 
would not only not help workers, but might even harm their interests.16 There are 
many reasons why labour law has been relatively insular, some of which are 
grounded in historical circumstances, but most of which are normative, in the 
sense that those who developed the arguments had a normative view about how 
the employment relationship should be regulated. It is also important to appreciate 
that the resistance to human rights law reflected beliefs from different ends of the 
political spectrum – both the left and the right. 
 
Private Law for Private Power 
 
Labour law is primarily a discipline that involves private relations; the employer is 
a private entity most of the time, and the workers are private individuals. For this 
reason, it has been suggested that the regulation of the employment relationship 
requires the application of private law rules: contract law and tort law.17 Typically, 
contract law regulates relations between private individuals.  
 
On the most traditional analysis, the purpose of any contractual rule should be to 
protect freedom and individual autonomy. On a libertarian account of contractual 
freedom applied to the employment relationship, Richard Epstein argued for a 
contract at will with as little external intervention as possible.18 The definition of 
contract at will used by Epstein is as follows:19 
 
…men must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, 
and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, 
or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. 
It is a right which an employee may exercise in the same way, to the same 
extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer. 
 
For authors like Epstein, legal intervention could disturb contractual freedom of 
both the employer and the worker. For other authors, the contract of employment 
can be a legal mechanism that helps rebalance the inequality of bargaining power 
between the worker and the employer and correct the distributional implications of 
a labour market that may be unjust. Scholars that view the contract of employment 
as a central regulatory tool of the employment relationship recognise that it has a 
welfare role too.20  
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26 Ind Law J 311. 
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With scholarship focusing on the contract of employment as a private law 
instrument, human rights were in the past either absent or had a relatively marginal 
role in the literature, with very few exceptions.21 Human rights were traditionally 
viewed as part of public law, which regulates the relationship between the 
individual and the state, rather than between private individuals. 
 
Litigation 
 
A second reason why human rights had a limited effect on labour law was that 
when human rights were invoked, typically litigation and judicial intervention 
(rather than other types of civil society activism) came to lawyers’ minds.22 Legal 
scholars and activists used to be skeptical about the effect of litigation in this field. 
The main reason for this was that the judiciary has been viewed as conservative in 
many legal orders, including the United Kingdom.23 Values such as freedom of 
contract, individualism and property rights have been regarded as “traditional 
judicial values”,24 so the courts have been presented as a “deeply regressive force 
in the regulation of employment”.25  
 
The judiciary at a national and supranational level in many legal orders may have 
been reluctant to protect workers’ rights because these have traditionally been 
classified as social rights in human rights law, as explained above.26 The ECtHR 
itself was often criticised for not protecting workers’ claims under the ECHR.27  
 
Trade Unions 
 
A third reason why labour law was relatively resistant to human rights law 
probably stems from the role of trade unions and the importance attached to union 
power in the employment sphere. In the United Kingdom in the 20th century, 
collective labour relations were predominantly organised around a system that 
Kahn-Freund famously described as collective laissez-faire.28 In this system it was 
collective actors, namely employers and trade unions, which negotiated and agreed 
upon working conditions. For scholars in this tradition, state intervention was 
desirable only to the extent that it facilitated collective negotiations. When human 
rights were invoked in this setting, it was mainly in order to stress the importance 
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22 See, for instance, Hugh Collins The Law of Contract (Oxford University Press, 1986) at 44. 
23 Anne Davies “Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law” (2009) 38 Ind Law J 278 at 287. 
24 Davies, above n 26, at 278. 
25 Alan Bogg “Only Fools and Horses: Some Skeptical Reflections on the Right to Work” in 
Virginia Mantouvalou (ed) The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives at 175. 
26 See Virginia Mantouvalou “Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An 
Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation” (2013) 13 HRLR 529. The 
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27 See Keith Ewing, above n 18; Tonia Novitz, above n 18. 
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of workers’ right to organise.29 Apart from that, non-intervention by the state was 
what both employers and workers sought.30  
 
In recent years, with the decline of union membership, trade unions and workers in 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere seem to have made a strategic decision to turn 
to human rights as a tool to advance their interests.31 Human rights litigation 
emerged as an avenue to make the claims of workers heard, in a way that more 
traditional union activities did not achieve. The strategic decision to turn towards 
human rights may have also been triggered by a perception that unions promote 
their members’ economic interests, rather than all workers’ human rights or the 
economy more generally.32 As Kolben put it:33 
 
Framing labor rights as human rights thus shifts the labor discourse from 
economics and special interest politics to ethics and morality. In other words, 
activists and labor law scholars seek to harness the hegemonic status of 
human rights discourse in order to gain public support for a number of legal, 
political, and strategic objectives. 
 
By putting claims of workers in the language of human rights, these claims appear 
morally compelling, as well as universal and inalienable, which are key features of 
human rights. Human rights are strict entitlements that are resistant to trade-offs, 
so managerial interests in business efficiency no longer have primary weight when 
there is a conflict with workers’ rights. 
 
The decline in union power is one of the reasons why even some of the staunchest 
trade union advocates, like Hendy and Ewing, have turned to human rights law in 
order to find a voice for workers and their unions.34 Human rights law that once 
appeared irrelevant to trade union struggles slowly emerged as one of the few 
opportunities to challenge the employer and be heard. 
 
The international trade union movement has also endorsed the idea that trade 
union rights are part of human rights. For instance, the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC), which is a coalition of trade unions, places trade union and 
human rights at the core of its activities. This has been described as an indication 
of a “global shift in labor movements, which are beginning to conceive of 
themselves as part of the international human rights movement”.35 	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Harmondsworth) at 276–277. 
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31 See, for instance, Ewing and Hendy, above n 2; Lance Compa “Trade Unions and Human Rights” 
in Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa and Martha Davis (eds) Bringing Human Rights Home: A 
History of Human Rights in the United States (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) at 209. 
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449 at 461. 
33 Kolben, above n 35, at 462. 
34 See Ewing and Hendy, above n 2. 
35 Kolben, above n 35, at 457. 
 
Politics 
 
Human rights were also approached with scepticism because labour law, probably 
more so than any other area of private law, is viewed as a deeply political subject. 
It relates to economic power and to what many view as the struggles of the 
working class. Political parties take different approaches to labour law, and often 
base their political agenda on reforming labour relations. As it is such a political 
subject, some critics view human rights, with their appeal across the political 
spectrum, as potentially depoliticising. In addition, some argue that human rights 
have a confrontational edge that can erode the solidarity between workers.36 They 
can be divisive, because they are individualistic by nature, while the interests of 
labour are collective and must be collectively pursued. 
 
Economic Efficiency 
 
A further reason why there has been resistance to human rights in the labour 
relationship is that, according to a neoclassical economic analysis, state 
intervention in the labour market would hamper its efficient functioning.37 This is 
because employers will incur transaction costs that make them less competitive 
both on a local and global level. An inefficient labour market is undesirable both 
for employers and workers, because it would harm the economic interests of both. 
As human rights involve interventions in the market through law, they might 
render it inefficient. The issue of legal intervention and economic efficiency is an 
empirical point, which can be disputed. In any case, there is a different economic 
framework that is again concerned with economic efficiency but which supports 
regulation as being essential to correct “market failures”.38 It is also important to 
note, however, that it has been argued that labour rights may promote economic 
efficiency.39 
 
 
The Tracks Starting to Meet40 
 
The picture has changed in recent years. Academic scholars have been searching 
for a new framework for labour law in the context of economic globalisation, the 
increase of non-standard contracts of employment and the decline of union 
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37 See Anne Davies Perspectives on Labour Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 27. 
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Transnational Labour Standards” (1994) 23 Ind Law J 289. 
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power.41 Against this background, several authors have turned to human rights law 
as a new avenue for workers’ voice.42  
 
Integrated Approach 
 
In this context, the ECtHR (and other courts) have started to take what has been 
described as an integrated approach to the interpretation of the ECHR, which 
grants some protection to social and labour rights through the machinery of civil 
and political rights documents.43 The ECHR is a traditional civil and political 
rights treaty that also contains two labour rights: the prohibition of slavery, 
servitude, forced and compulsory labour (art 4) and freedom of association, 
including the right to form and join unions (art 11). In the interpretation of these 
and other Convention rights, and in contrast to its past stance, the ECtHR has 
begun to take note of materials of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the 
ECSR and other social rights bodies, which served as a source of inspiration and a 
way to understand more deeply the object and purpose of rights guaranteed by the 
Convention. By adopting an integrated approach to interpretation, the Court 
became more receptive to workers’ claims and appeared to recognise that some 
labour rights are human rights, and that the dividing line of civil and political, on 
the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other, was not as clear as had 
been assumed in the past. 
 
Some of the landmark cases where the Court demonstrated its openness to workers’ 
claims raised issues under art 4 of the ECHR. Siliadin v France44 involved a 
Togolese national who was brought to France to work and be educated, but was 
instead kept at home as a domestic worker. She had to clean the house and the 
employer’s office, to look after three children; she slept on the floor in their room; 
she rarely had a day off; she was almost never paid. When she escaped her 
employers, she was faced with the fact that French law did not criminalise their 
conduct. The Court had to assess whether her situation could be classified as 
slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour. In this context, it interpreted art 4 
of the ECHR taking ILO materials into account, and for the first time in its history 
it ruled that the provision had been violated. It found that the applicant was held in 
servitude, and that France had an obligation under the Convention to criminalise 
the employer’s conduct. Rantsev v Russia and Cyprus45 addressed trafficking for 
sexual exploitation for the first time. The Court again took an integrated approach 
to the interpretation of the ECHR, and ruled that sex trafficking was prohibited 
under art 4 of the Convention. In these cases, art 4 was interpreted in light of 
materials of specialist bodies, such as the ILO, and a domestic worker and a sex 
worker won in Strasbourg. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 There is much scholarship on these issues. See, for instance, Guy Davidov and Brian Langille 
(eds) The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2011); Joanne Conaghan, Richard Fischl 
and Karl Klare (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
42 See above n 2. 
43 Mantouvalou, above n 29. 
44 Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16 (Section II, ECHR). 
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Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania, 46 to give another example, involved the 
applicants’ dismissal and ban from access to work in the public and many parts of 
the private sector, because they were former KGB members. The Court recognised 
that dismissal and a ban from access to work created “serious difficulties […] in 
terms of earning [a] living, with obvious repercussions on the enjoyment of […] 
private lives”.47 It classified the claim as falling within the right to private life 
under art 8 of the ECHR, and concluded that the employer’s conduct violated art 8, 
read in conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination in art 14. It is important 
to note that the Court here placed special emphasis on right to work rulings of the 
ECSR. It underlined that:48 
 
[It] attaches particular weight in this respect to the text of Article 1 § 2 of the 
European Social Charter and the interpretation given by the European 
Committee of Social Rights […]. 
 
This ECtHR analysis is a good example of the adoption of an integrated approach 
to interpretation of the ECHR, which integrates civil and social rights into the 
scope of the Convention in the context of the right to work.49 
 
Labour law scholars also celebrated a line of collective labour rights cases. In 
2001, the Court in Wilson and Palmer for the first time in its history ruled that 
there had been a breach of art 11 of the Convention in favour of workers.50 Later, 
Demir and Baykara51 was viewed as a paradigm of the integrated approach.52 Here, 
the respondent Government challenged the use of ILO materials in the 
interpretation of art 11 of the ECHR because it had not signed up to them. The 
Court was firm:53 
 
The Court observes in this connection that in searching for common ground 
among the norms of international law it has never distinguished between 
sources of law according to whether or not they have been signed or ratified 
by the respondent State. 
 
These sources are used in order to find the object and purpose of the Convention 
provisions, to which Member States have signed up.54  
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53 At [78]. 
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Following Demir and Baykara, Ewing and Hendy said that in this decision:55 
 
…human rights have established their superiority over economic 
irrationalism and ‘competitiveness’ in the battle for the soul of labour law, 
and in which public law has triumphed over private law and public lawyers 
over private lawyers. 
 
The adoption of the integrated approach meant that the separation between civil 
and social rights had started to become blurred, which could have important 
positive implications for the protection of workers’ rights. 
 
Uncertainty 
 
The protection of workers’ rights through the ECHR has not been entirely 
consistent. The enthusiasm inspired particularly by Demir and Baykara may have 
been premature; in more recent case law, the Court seems to have returned to its 
previous reluctant stance. In Palomo Sanchez v Spain,56 for example, delivery 
workers employed by an industrial bakery company brought proceedings against 
the company claiming that they should be recognised as employees rather than 
self-employed or non-salaried workers. They set up a trade union to promote their 
interests. In the context of their dispute, the trade union newsletter published a 
cartoon that depicted the human resources manager of the company receiving 
sexual gratification for favours he had done for some workers. The newsletter also 
contained other critical passages. The workers were subsequently summarily 
dismissed. In Strasbourg, the applicants claimed that their dismissal violated their 
freedom of expression protected in art 10 of the ECHR, which should in this case 
be read in light of their right to freedom of association in art 11. The claim was 
that free speech rights should be contextualised and given special protection in the 
trade union context. The majority of the ECtHR ruled that the dismissal did not 
violate the Convention. 
 
However, a powerful dissent argued that the majority did not sufficiently 
appreciate the particularities of the trade union context. In order to do so, the 
dissenting judges said that the majority should have paid more attention to the 
context, which it could have achieved to a certain degree if it had adopted an 
integrated approach:57 
 
…trade-union freedom of expression is unanimously regarded as an essential 
and indispensable aspect of the right of association, it being a prerequisite to 
the fulfillment of the goals of associations and trade unions, as is quite clear 
from the documents of the International Labour Organization and the case-
law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights cited by the Grand 
Chamber as relevant material. 	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57 At [5] (dissent). 
 
The dissent in Palomo Sanchez indicates that the ECtHR may have an insufficient 
grasp of the effect of restrictions on free speech for a trade union in the context of 
a labour dispute. It may also indicate a broader lack of understanding of the special 
function and role of human rights against employer interference. 
 
More recently, a case on the right to strike further illustrated challenges in the 
developing case law on workers’ rights as human rights, despite the fact that the 
applicants argued very strongly for the adoption of an integrated approach to the 
interpretation of the ECHR. In RMT v United Kingdom,58 the Court addressed the 
issue of secondary action, which is banned in English law. The applicant union of 
transport workers suggested that the ban violated their rights under art 11 of the 
Convention. The applicants were all members of the union RMT. They were 
initially employed by a company called Jarvis, and were then transferred to a 
smaller company, Hydrex. Their terms and conditions were at first kept as they 
were, according to a legal requirement, but deteriorated later on. Industrial action 
by Hydrex employees only would not be effective, so RMT sought to organise 
industrial action at the bigger company, Jarvis. As English law does not protect 
secondary action, it was not possible to do this. The Court accepted that secondary 
action falls within the scope of art 11.  
 
The trade union relied heavily on ILO and ECSR materials, which were critical of 
United Kingdom law with regards to secondary actions. When examining 
materials of expert bodies in interpreting the ECHR, the Court often seeks to 
establish whether there is an emerging international or European consensus on the 
topic in question.59 In RMT, the applicants invoked numerous international and 
regional materials in support of their claim,60 and the Court said that these might 
indeed be relevant, but were not decisive because the nature of review in 
Strasbourg is different to the supervision by the ILO and the ECSR:61 
 
…the Court considers that the negative assessments made by the relevant 
monitoring bodies of the ILO and European Social Charter are not of such 
persuasive weight for determining whether the operation of the statutory ban 
on secondary strikes in circumstances such as those complained of in the 
present case remained within the range of permissible options open to the 
national authorities under Article 11 of the Convention. 
 
Although it seems that the Court seeks to find consensus by looking at a range of 
materials,62 it is both questionable what weight it should give to such consensus 
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generally,63 and unclear how it should use any established consensus. Here, 
turning to the permitted limitations to the right, it found that the restriction of 
sympathy action was legitimate. The limitation pursued the aim of protecting the 
rights of those who are not parties to the dispute, and was proportionate to the aim 
pursued. This is because in sensitive matters of labour and social policy, such as a 
secondary strike, the Court will allow a wide margin of appreciation.64 In this case, 
it preferred to recognise discretion to state authorities, rather than challenge 
English law on industrial action.  
 
The Court’s uncertainty regarding the guiding principles for applying the 
Convention to issues involving workers’ rights also emerged in a case on prison 
work, Stummer v Austria.65 Mr Stummer spent approximately 28 years in prison. 
During this time, he worked for long periods in the prison kitchen or the prison 
bakery without being affiliated to the old age pension system. When he applied for 
an early retirement pension, his application was rejected because he had not 
accumulated the required amount of insurance months. The reason why no 
contributions were made for Mr Stummer during the full period of his employment 
was that the prison authorities kept 75 per cent of his pay, so his salary did not 
suffice for pension contributions. It should be added that work is compulsory in 
prison: refusal to work while in prison carries penalties, such as withdrawal of 
certain rights, and may even amount to solitary confinement.  
 
The applicant claimed that prison work without affiliation to an old age pension 
system should not be viewed as ordinary in the course of detention, so it violated 
art 4, as well as art 1 of Protocol 1 (property) together with art 14 (discrimination). 
The majority of the Court rejected Stummer’s claims. However, a strong 
dissenting opinion suggested that his treatment was a violation of the Convention. 
The distinction between prisoners and other workers “produces a long-term effect 
going well beyond the legitimate requirements of serving a particular prison 
term”,66 and violates the prohibition of discrimination in conjunction with the right 
to property. In a further dissenting opinion, moreover, Judge Tulkens argued that 
“work without adequate social cover can no longer be regarded as normal work”,67 
and suggested that in this instance there was also a violation of the prohibition of 
slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour. 
 
Recent case law on the protection of workers’ rights under the ECHR suggests that, 
even though the tracks of human rights and labour law have started to meet, there 	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is still uncertainty as to the application of human rights in the employment context. 
The ECtHR has sometimes been willing to seek inspiration in materials of expert 
bodies, such as the ILO and the ECSR, but in other instances it has decided to 
leave workers’ rights unprotected, even in the face of strong evidence that bodies 
with expertise had taken a different approach to the problem in question.  
 
 
Exploitation 
 
The inconsistencies in the ECtHR case law should probably not come as a surprise. 
After all, the Court has only recently started to engage with workers’ rights (since 
the early 2000s). At the same time, in recent years it has faced persistent political 
pressure by the United Kingdom Government, which has threatened to withdraw 
from the Convention because it views the Strasbourg Court as having gone too far 
in protecting human rights.68 
 
How should the Court be approaching workers’ rights in the ECHR? In order to 
address this question and the current uncertainty, I will examine a possible 
justification for workers’ rights as human rights on the basis of an idea that is 
underexplored in labour law and human rights literature: exploitation.  
 
The prohibition of exploitation is not of course explicitly included in the 
Convention or in other human rights documents. Human rights law does not 
contain a right not to be exploited as such, however the concept of exploitation has 
figured in case law and has been linked to slavery and human trafficking. The 
ECtHR refers to exploitation when examining art 4 in the Siliadin case, discussed 
earlier, and exploitation was further mentioned in CN v United Kingdom.69 In CN, 
which involved a migrant domestic worker in the United Kingdom, the 
Government argued that English law contained effective legislation on trafficking, 
and claimed that, for the purposes of s 4 of the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants) Act, “exploitation meant behaviour that contravened 
article 4”.70 The Equality and Human Rights Commission, intervening as a third 
party in the case, pointed to the low number of prosecutions under the Act, despite 
the fact that a far larger number of individuals had been recognised as victims of 
trafficking. It stated that there was a need for clarity in English law as to “what 
amounted to forced labour as distinct from exploitation”.71 The ECtHR said in 
turn:72 
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…domestic servitude is a specific offence, distinct from trafficking and 
exploitation, which involves a complex set of dynamics, involving both overt 
and more subtle forms of coercion, to force compliance. A thorough 
investigation into complaints of such conduct therefore requires an 
understanding of the many subtle ways an individual can fall under the 
control of another. 
 
When examining art 4, the United Kingdom Supreme Court has also said that 
“[f]orced labour is not fully defined and may take various forms, but exploitation 
is at its heart”.73 
 
The Court generally interprets art 4 by taking account of international and 
European law on human trafficking, where labour exploitation is described as 
follows:74 
 
Exploitation shall include, as a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
including begging, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the 
exploitation of criminal activities, or the removal of organs. 
 
Even though the above are simply examples of exploitation and not a definition of 
the concept, it is clear that art 4 case law refers to exploitation as a moral wrong, 
which the Convention can address. The term is used when a worker is found in a 
situation akin to slavery, which violates art 4. The elements upon which the 
ECtHR relies to determine whether there is such severe exploitation include: no 
pay for work performed, isolation, confiscation of legal documents, deception, and 
background conditions of poverty. The combination of these individual and 
structural factors may lead to a finding that the worker is faced with serious 
coercion and hence is in a situation of slavery or servitude.  
 
The classification of some instances of abuse of workers’ rights as exploitative and 
hence in breach of art 4 is a welcome development, for it demonstrates the 
recognition and protection of workers’ dignity in human rights law. Yet it is too 
narrow. Is it correct to only protect workers from exploitation when they are faced 
with the most extreme forms of it?  
 
Modern accounts of political theory attempt to explain what is wrong with 
exploitation.75 These accounts may help to shed light on our understanding of 
exploitation in law. The starting point is usually that exploitation occurs when 
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someone takes unfair advantage of someone else.76 Exploitation of a person occurs 
when someone takes advantage of that person’s vulnerability.77 Someone may take 
advantage of another’s various kinds of vulnerability, his or her needs or desires, 
but this will not always be classified as wrongful exploitation in the sense 
discussed here. However, when someone’s vulnerability is due to a significantly 
weaker bargaining position than the other, and the stronger party uses this 
vulnerability, then a situation of exploitation is present.78 It has been argued that 
“those who depend upon particular others for the satisfaction of their basic needs 
are rendered, by that dependency, susceptible to exploitation by those upon whom 
they depend”.79  
 
For exploitation to be objectionable, on Goodin’s influential view, a person in “an 
especially strong position vis-à-vis another” must take advantage of the other’s 
vulnerability.80 Goodin argues that such extreme vulnerability may consist of 
asymmetry of power between the parties, the possession by the powerful of what 
the weaker party needs, a monopoly of the powerful over what the other needs, 
and control of this object by the powerful. Even though this account contains 
important insights, such as the role of need and asymmetry of power, it is narrow, 
particularly because it requires a monopoly of the powerful. As Sample puts it, this 
account is “not merely taking advantage, but kicking a person when he is down”.81  
 
What emerges is that, in modern political thought, exploitation is analysed as a 
wrong, and significant attention has been paid to what may constitute exploitation, 
namely taking unfair advantage of vulnerability. Vulnerability may consist of 
someone’s need. Most people work because with the income gained through work 
they can satisfy their basic needs: without this income, most people would be 
destitute.82 For this reason, workers are always in a position of need and are 
therefore prone to exploitation. At the same time, workers are in a weak 
bargaining position in relation to their employers. They need their job, and they 
depend upon their employer because there is a scarcity of jobs. Employers may 
impose working conditions that are exploitative exactly because they know there is 
job scarcity and they are likely to be able to replace workers without much 
difficulty. It is clear, in other words, that workers are vulnerable to exploitation. 
Migrant workers in particular may be especially prone to exploitation, because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Wertheimer, above n 87, at 10; Robert Goodin “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person” 
in Andrew Reeve (ed) Modern Theories of Exploitation (Sage Publications, London, 1987) at 171; 
Matt Zwolinski “Structural Exploitation” (2012) 29 Soc Philos Policy 154 at 156. 
77 Allen Wood “Exploitation” in Kory Schaff (ed) Philosophy and the Problems of Work: A Reader 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2001) 141 at 147. 
78 Wood, above n 89, at 148. 
79 Goodin, above n 87, at 121. 
80 Goodin, above n 87, at 125. 
81 Sample, above n 87, at 31. 
82 People, of course, work for other important reasons too. See Hugh Collins “Is There a Human 
Right to Work?” in Virginia Mantouvalou (ed) The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical 
Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2015) 17. 
their immigration status may depend on being employed more generally, or even 
on being employed by a particular employer.83 
 
At the same time, for exploitation to occur there does not need to be a situation 
akin to slavery. There are other forms of exploitation that involve violations of 
workers’ rights. For instance, there are many situations where employers underpay 
or do not pay their employees if they are undocumented workers. In these 
instances, the employers are often aware that the workers are particularly 
vulnerable because if they go to the authorities they are likely to be arrested and 
deported. Employers take advantage of this vulnerability by underpaying them or 
not paying them at all, and sometimes the law in certain jurisdictions, such as the 
United Kingdom, does not protect workers from such exploitation. Workers do not 
have a right to be paid for work performed under an illegal contract.84 The ECHR 
does not contain a right to a minimum wage, but it can fairly be argued that 
situations such as this violate the right to property, which is protected in art 1 of 
Protocol 1 of the Convention, possibly together with the prohibition of 
discrimination.85 The prohibition of exploitation can serve as a guiding principle in 
the interpretation of the ECHR on issues such as this. 
  
As discussed earlier, the Convention is a traditional civil and political rights 
document, which only contains few labour rights. However, this does not mean 
that the ECtHR cannot interpret the existing provisions in ways that protect 
workers from exploitation. The prohibition of exploitation can ground rights, such 
as a minimum wage, as well as trade union rights that strengthen the vulnerable 
position of workers. The adoption of an integrated approach, as described above, 
provides the Court with certain tools that enable it to interpret the Convention in a 
way that prohibits exploitation. To return to the case law, Stummer, the prison 
worker, was exploited by the prison authorities because they took advantage of his 
vulnerability: as a prisoner, he was not free to not work or to work for a different 
employer. There are many instances of exploitation of prison workers,86 and it is 
unfortunate that the majority of the Court did not take the opportunity to 
acknowledge exploitation in this case. The dissenting judges, on the other hand, 
rightly stated that his treatment constituted a violation of the Convention.  
 
In collective labour law cases, the idea of exploitation as a guiding principle of the 
Court’s case law suggests that there is very little scope for a margin of 	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appreciation to national authorities when the state or employers interfere with 
freedom of association. Workers’ organisations have the counteraction of the 
inequality of bargaining power between employers and workers as their main 
purpose. In this way they help to address workers’ vulnerability to exploitation. 
For this reason, workers’ collective labour rights must be given strong protection 
against employers. In Palomo Sanchez, the background dispute about whether the 
workers were self-employed indicates that the workers may have been exploited. 
That the Court was unwilling to give their right to free speech strong protection in 
the context of this dispute did not help to address their vulnerability in bargaining 
with their employer. As famously stated in Handyside, the Convention protects 
views that shock or disturb the State or a part of the population,87 and this 
protection should extend to the trade union context. Similarly, the unwillingness of 
the ECtHR to protect sympathy industrial action in RMT did little to counteract the 
inequality of power that leads to vulnerability and exploitation, despite strong 
indications in ILO and ECSR materials of the importance of such action in the 
labour context. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Human rights law plays an increasingly important role in the employment 
relationship context. An examination of the ECtHR and its case law shows that 
there is some willingness to protect workers’ rights through an integrated approach 
to interpreting the Convention. The Strasbourg Court often takes note of materials 
of the ILO and the ECSR in order to interpret the ECHR, which has been 
celebrated in labour law scholarship.88 Yet the ECtHR is a supranational body and 
is sometimes faced with hostility by national authorities. Workers’ rights, and 
other social rights, were until recently viewed as non-justiciable through individual 
petitions before human rights bodies. The employment relationship was also 
typically viewed as an area that must be regulated through contract and other 
private law rules, rather than through public law. For reasons such as these, there 
is much uncertainty as to the future direction of the protection of workers’ rights 
as human rights. 
 
This article suggests that the ECtHR has opened the door to the protection of 
workers’ rights both by taking note of findings of the ILO and other expert bodies, 
and by protecting certain applicants from forms of exploitation that are akin to 
slavery and servitude. Yet the approach of the Court thus far appears to be both 
uncertain and narrow. This paper therefore argues for the recognition of a different 
account of exploitation, which consists of taking account of someone’s 
vulnerability. Human rights law can, in turn, address exploitation by safeguarding 
workers’ rights, such as a minimum wage, and by strengthening workers’ 
bargaining power through protection of collective labour rights. The prohibition of 
exploitation can serve as a guiding principle in Strasbourg case law, as well as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 (ECHR) at [49]. 
88 Mantouvalou, above n 26; Ewing and Hendy, above n 2. 
case law of other bodies that explore the legal protection of workers’ rights as 
human rights.  
 
Human rights can provide an important critical perspective for labour law, as well 
as an important tool for the protection of workers’ rights. “The importance of 
human rights […]”, as Joseph Raz puts it in a recent essay:89 
 
…is in affirming the worth of all human beings, and in distributing power 
away from the powerful to everyone, including any group or association 
willing to advocate and promote the interests of ordinary people. 
 
One way in which human rights can achieve this rebalancing of power is through 
the protection of workers from exploitation. The prohibition of exploitation is one, 
but not the sole, justification for conceptualising workers’ rights as human rights.90 
However, a modern understanding of the prohibition of exploitation in the 
workplace can be an important guiding principle in achieving dignity of workers 
against employer abuse. 
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